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Tagging the Lanham Act
PROTECTING GRAFFITI ART FROM WILLFUL
INFRINGEMENT
INTRODUCTION
Art has long been integral to society’s sense of culture, life,
and liberty, and conceptions of what constitutes art and who the
artists are in our society have evolved in the thousands of years
since our ancestors first sketched on cave walls. But as the role of
art in society has changed, so have the demands for the legal
protection of that art. Graffiti has gone from being known as the
result of troubled youth tagging walls to commercially
commissioned art, and monetizing graffiti is now a possibility.
John F. Kennedy said, “If art is to nourish the roots of our culture,
society must set the artist free to follow his vision wherever it
takes him.”1 To achieve this, society must protect artists’
ownership rights. Protecting artists’ rights can be difficult,
however, for nontraditional art forms like graffiti.
Graffiti has been described as a perennial feature “of life at
the edges of the contemporary city.”2 While graffiti once signified
urban blight, it has become a sought-after art form. It has been
reprinted on commercial items and removed from its original
location and displayed in galleries.3 Graffiti artists produce pieces
that, like President Kennedy suggested, will nourish the roots of
our culture if the artists are free to follow their vision. A recent
example of this is the response to Banksy, the popular and elusive
British graffiti artist. When Banksy created a piece depicting the
1 President John F. Kennedy: Remarks at Amherst College, October 26, 1963,
NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, https://www.arts.gov/about/kennedy [http://perma.cc/
62NP-6T3F] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016); see Michelle Bougdanos, The Visual Artists Rights
Act and Its Application to Graffiti Murals: Whose Wall Is It Anyway?, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 549, 551 (2002) (quoting SIMON G. ARINK, JOHN F. KENNEDY: THE MAN AND THE
PRESIDENCY 105 (1987)).
2 Cameron McAuliffe, Graffiti or Street Art? Negotiating the Moral
Geographies of the Creative City, 34 J. URB. AFF. 189, 189 (2012).
3 Cathay Y. N. Smith, Street Art: An Analysis under U.S. Intellectual
Property Law and Intellectual Property’s Negative Space Theory, 24 DEPAUL J. ART,
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 259, 262-63 (2013).
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twin towers “looming over the Manhattan skyline,” one person
described it as being “beautiful,” and people from across New York
City flocked to see it before it was removed.4 Today, however,
graffiti art is often reproduced and sold without the artists’
permission.5 One graffiti artist aptly framed the issue by stating
that “people think that because our art is public and it is
sometimes illegally painted, they could use it any way they want.”6
The unauthorized use of graffiti art has highlighted the
need for better legal protections of graffiti art. For other art forms,
the most common methods of protection—copyright and moral
rights—do not similarly protect illegally created works of art.
There are a few reasons why protecting graffiti art is particularly
difficult. There is a normative intuition that the law should not
protect something that is a product of illegal activity. Moreover,
many graffiti artists do not want to sell their work—as one artist
said, “many . . . [graffiti artists] feel that it is a breach of integrity
to do this sort of stuff for profit.”7 Although many graffiti artists
traditionally had no intention of profiting from their art (and thus
protection was not needed), the fact that graffiti is becoming
popular is leading others to profit from it illegitimately. Hence,
artists need protection as a result of others’ unauthorized use.
This note considers a current case of graffiti art that is
being used without authorization, explores various potential ways
of protecting graffiti art, and evaluates the likelihood that such
methods will be effective. Part I examines the roots and legal
definition of graffiti art. It then considers whether graffiti art
should be protected. Part II examines three sources of law—moral
rights, copyright, and the Lanham Act—as possible avenues for
protecting graffiti artists’ work. Finally, Part III argues that
graffiti artists will likely be best protected by section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.

4 James Baron, Racing to See Bansky, While It Can Still Be Seen, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/16/nyregion/racing-to-see-banksygraffiti-while-it-can-still-be-seen.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/7SNM-4R8B].
5 Smith, supra note 3, at 264-65.
6 Jamison Davies, Art Crimes?: Theoretical Perspectives on Copyright
Protection for Illegally-Created Graffiti Art, 65 ME. L. REV. 27, 29 (2012).
7 Graffiti Q&A, GRAFFITI, http://www.graffiti.org/faq/graffiti_questions.html
[http://perma.cc/T5AB-RYTT] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
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WHAT IS GRAFFITI, AND WHY SHOULD WE PROTECT IT?

Graffiti is a form of expression that dates back to the
ancient Greeks and Egyptians.8 American graffiti can be traced to
colonial times.9 In the 1960s, graffiti as we know it today emerged
and included “everything from random scrawls to mural work.”10
Now, as the result of artists like Bansky, the legal system has
accepted (if not legalized) the notion of graffiti, for better or worse,
and many states have codified the definition of graffiti.11
There are two general types of graffiti: graffiti vandalism
and graffiti art. The distinction between the two categorizations
often hinges on the creator’s motivation. Generally, the impetus
behind graffiti vandalism is to break the law, whereas the
motivation behind graffiti art is to create art.12 Some graffiti
artists have additional motivations for creating graffiti art—for
example, one graffiti artist is motivated to create pieces because
he believes it will “beautify and benefit business.”13 Graffiti art
could benefit business by beautifying a building or attracting a new
customer base. There have been cases in both federal and state
courts that test the boundaries of what constitutes graffiti art.
A.

Recent Cases

There are strong policy considerations that weigh in favor
of protecting graffiti art. These stem from the same interests
society has in protecting all other forms of art. Generally, an
artist should “have the right to prevent the use of his or her name
as the author of the work . . . in the event of a distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation.”14 Graffiti artists have
8 Marisa A. Gómez, The Writing on Our Walls: Finding Solutions Through
Distinguishing Graffiti Art from Graffiti Vandalism, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 633, 636 (1993).
9 Id. at 637.
10 Id. at 639.
11 In Georgia, graffiti is defined as

any inscriptions, words, figures, paintings, or other defacements that are written,
marked, etched, scratched, sprayed, drawn, painted, or engraved on or otherwise
affixed to any surface of real property or improvements thereon without prior
authorization of the owner or occupant of the property by means of any aerosol
paint container, broad-tipped marker, gum label, paint stick, graffiti stick, etching
equipment, brush, or other device capable of scarring or leaving a visible mark on
any surface.
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-15A-2 (2012).
12 Bougdanos, supra note 1, at 559; see, e.g., Gómez, supra note 8, at 635.
13 Bougdanos, supra note 1, at 549.
14 Id. at 556.
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attempted to exercise this right but have reached dead ends in
many different sources of law. These artists claim that the
unauthorized use of their work affects their reputation and creates
the impression that the artists are “corporate ‘sellouts.’”15 But
they do not feel that using intellectual property law as protection
is selling out; generally, they view it as “quite the opposite.”16 In
fact, some of these artists may feel that legal recognition and
protection of graffiti art validates their works.
Recently, a dispute over the use of graffiti art has
garnered media attention. Three graffiti artists filed a suit
against Roberto Cavalli17 seeking damages and injunctive relief.18
The plaintiffs alleged that Cavalli introduced a clothing and
accessories line called Just Cavalli, where each piece in the
collection was covered with graffiti art derived from a mural that
was used without the artists’ consent.19 The plaintiffs, Jason
Williams, Victor Chapa, and Jeffrey Rubin, who are “known as
Revok, Reyes, and Steel, respectively,” claimed that Cavalli’s use
of their mural “in a clothing and accessories line was a willful
infringement.”20 The complaint alleged that Revok, Reyes, and
Steel (the Artists) are three of street art’s most acclaimed figures
whose work has been exhibited around the world, but that they
“have never consented to lend their artwork to consumer products
of any kind.”21 The complaint further contended that “one can
easily discern” that Just Cavalli is a copy of the mural.22 The
Artists claimed that the use of this well-known mural “has
[damaged], and will continue to[] damage Plaintiffs’ reputations
and careers.”23 The complaint alleged five causes of action,
including copyright infringement, unfair competition under the

15 Bill Donahue, Graffiti Artists Sue Roberto Cavalli for Copying Mural,
LAW360 (Aug. 26, 2014, 2:43 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/570914/graffitiartists-sue-roberto-cavalli-for-copying-mural [http://perma.cc/6FKE-2AKV].
16 Elie, Three Graffiti Artists File Suit Against Roberto Cavalli for Using Their
Mural in New Fashion Lines Without Permission, BOWERYBOOGIE.COM (Sept. 3, 2014, 6:05
AM), http://www.boweryboogie.com/2014/09/three-graffiti-artists-file-suit-roberto-cavalliusing-mural-new-fashion-lines-without-permission/ [http://perma.cc/4MXZ-GGTY].
17 Id.
18 See generally Complaint, Williams v. Cavalli, No. 2:14-cv-06659 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 25, 2014).
19 Eriq
Gardner, It’s Official: Suing Over Graffiti Is Fashionable,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Aug. 26, 2014, 2:22 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thresq/official-suing-graffiti-is-fashionable-728198 [http://perma.cc/X3S2-7CP5].
20 Elie, supra note 16, at 2.
21 Complaint, supra note 18, at 2.
22 Id. at 3.
23 Id. at 4.
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Lanham Act, false designation of origin under the Lanham Act,
and two state law claims (unfair competition and negligence).24
The complaint further stated that “[n]othing is more
antithetical to the outsider ‘street cred’ that is essential to graffiti
artists . . . than the association with European chic, luxury and
glamour—of which Cavalli is the epitome.”25 The Artists claimed
that the use of their mural was even more egregious than just
unauthorized use because the work that Cavalli misappropriated
included plaintiffs’ “stylized signatures from the [m]ural (literally,
their names).”26 Most of the mural was made up of the Artists’
personal signatures, which “is not uncommon to graffiti art.”27
Plaintiffs claimed that, to make matters worse, Cavalli did some
of his own painting over the Artists’ painting and “added what
appears to be a signature, creating the false impression that
Roberto Cavalli himself was the artist.”28 In response to the suit,
Roberto Cavalli has refused to admit any wrongdoing.29 Cavalli’s
spokesperson stated that in order to save time and money, they
were looking “to discuss a mutually agreeable resolution of the
issues.”30 On February 12, 2015, a district court in the Central
District of California held that because the mural had sourceidentifying attributes, Cavalli had violated section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.31
B.

Policy Considerations

Graffiti artists should have legal avenues to protect their
art. And while there are strong policy reasons for protecting
graffiti art, there are also policy reasons against legally protecting
graffiti artists. The arguments for protection include recognition
of artists’ works, progression of the arts, and encouraging artistic
expression. While the majority of graffiti artists are not seeking to
display their art in galleries, graffiti artists should still be able to

Id. at 9-16.
Id.
26 Elie, supra note 16, at 2.
27 Complaint, supra note 18, at 7.
28 Gardner, supra note 19.
29 Lauren Milligan, Cavalli Bites Back in Graffiti Case, VOGUE (Aug. 29, 2014),
http://www.vogue.co.uk/news/2014/08/29/roberto-cavalli-responds-to-graffiti-lawsuit
[http://perma.cc/97NG-LU2S].
30 Id.
31 Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, Williams v. Cavalli, No. 2:14-cv-06659 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 25, 2014), https://thestyleofthecase.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/denied.pdf
[http://perma.cc/ZNS5-4ZA5].
24
25
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protect their ownership of their art.32 Failing to provide legal
protection to graffiti artists inhibits the “advancement and
progression of the arts.”33 The proponents of graffiti art “recognize
that some works have extraordinary merit and deserve both
recognition and preservation.”34 Proponents also feel that graffiti
artists are not motivated by a desire to vandalize, but rather to
express themselves or “to gain respect by the only means that are
accessible to them.”35
On the other side of the argument, many citizens and
public officials wish to eradicate graffiti and are enraged by the
effort and cost associated with graffiti removal.36 Lawmakers have
come up with creative ways to prevent graffiti, including
“regulating the sale of graffiti instruments . . . forcing property
owners to pay for graffiti removal; developing and using graffitiresistant materials on buildings; enforcing curfew restrictions for
minors; focusing efforts on immediate cleanup; and using murals
and commissioned works both to promote and prevent graffiti
art.”37 Those opposed to graffiti argue that graffiti is vandalism,
notwithstanding its artistic value.38
Additionally, opponents feel that graffiti is “ugly, invites
criminal activity, indicates neighborhood decay and is done by
criminals who should be punished.”39 Moreover, they argue that it
is very costly.40 Mayor Rudy Giuliani of New York City was an
advocate of the “‘broken window’ theory,” which posits that “an
unfixed broken window in a building gives a city block the
appearance of decay and disrepair, and thus encourages the
congregation of lawless individuals, who see the physical
deterioration as a sign that their shady activities will go
unnoticed.”41 Mayor Giuliani believed that graffiti, like an unfixed
broken window, signified urban decay.42 He further argued that
“[o]nce the criminal element is established on a block or in a
32 Danwill Schwender, Promotion of the Arts: An Argument for Limited
Copyright Protection of Illegal Graffiti, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 257, 257 (2007).
33 Id. at 258.
34 Lori L. Hanesworth, Are They Graffiti Artists or Vandals? Should They Be
Able or Caned?: A Look at the Latest Legislative Attempts to Eradicate Graffiti, 6
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 225, 227 (1995).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 234.
38 Id. at 227.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Annette Hall, The Mayor’s Anti-Graffiti Task Force: May the Force Be With
You, COOPERATOR, http://www.cooperator.com/articles/1201/1/The-Mayor8217s-Anti-Graffiti
-Task-Force/Page1.html [http://perma.cc/EFR7-68XS] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
42 Id.
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neighborhood, law-abiding citizens start avoiding the area,
leaving it to the miscreants and loiterers, and eventually the
pestilence spreads outward into otherwise ‘healthy’ blocks.”43
The problem with graffiti is that there are strong
arguments on both sides of the policy debate. But since protecting
art is considered so integral to our society, lawmakers should
attempt to protect it while safeguarding against the problems
identified by the opposition. Many of the arguments raised by
Mayor Giuliani and other graffiti opponents might be less
persuasive now, because fewer people think of graffiti as urban
blight and instead consider it an act of expression. It may be time
for a reevaluation of graffiti’s merit.
II.

POTENTIAL LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR GRAFFITI ART

Graffiti artists have three options for protecting their art
against the kind of infringement that Cavalli committed against
Revok, Reyes, and Steel, and the infringement discussed
generally in Part I.44 These options include suing under the Visual
Artists Rights Act (VARA), copyright law, and the Lanham Act.
A.

VARA and Moral Rights

The first potential source of law that might provide
protection to graffiti artists is VARA, which codifies moral
rights.45 “The term ‘moral rights’ is a translation of the French
term ‘droit moral,’ and refers . . . to the ability of authors to
control the eventual fate of their works.”46 Moral rights safeguard
both the reputational and personal value of the work.47 These
rights were initially developed based on the belief that “[t]o
deform an artist’s work is to present him to the public as the
creator of a work not his own, and thus makes him subject to
criticism for work he has not done.”48 Moral rights exist separately
from other rights, such as economic and property rights, and
allow an author to “protect a work—essentially a piece of the
Id.
See supra Part I.
45 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b) (2012).
46 Betsy Rosenblatt, Moral Rights Basics, HARV. L. SCH., https://cyber.law.
harvard.edu/property/library/moralprimer.html [http://perma.cc/EB3J-ERCE] (last visited
Mar. 4, 2016).
47 Id.
48 Brian T. McCartney, “Creepings” and “Glimmers” of the Moral Rights of
Artists in American Copyright Law, 6 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 35, 39 (1998) (quoting Gilliam
v. Am. Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976)).
43
44
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author—from unauthorized treatment, even after relinquishing
economic and property rights.”49 The rights stem from the right of
integrity that “prevents alteration of a creative artist’s work that
would injure her honor or reputation.”50 Moral rights give the
artist the right to “(1) have her name associated with her work,
(2) disavow her association with a work, and (3) prevent having
another’s name associated with her work.”51 Moral rights were
codified in 1990 by VARA, which created statutory moral rights
and was essentially an extension of the Copyright Act.52
VARA, based largely on state law and European notions of
how to afford artists control over the fate of their works, “provides
a visual artist with rights of integrity and attribution.”53 VARA is,
in part, the United States’ acceptance of the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,54 an international
convention that provided creators, such as artists, with the means
to control how their creations are used.55 VARA, however, is not
as protective as the Berne Convention. While the Berne
Convention protects all works of art, VARA only protects visual
works of art.56
An artist who wishes to pursue a claim under VARA must
prove that the graffiti is a “piece of visual art” of “recognized
stature.”57 The first element of a VARA claim, “piece of visual art,”
is narrowly defined as a “painting, drawing, print, sculpture, or
still photographic image.”58 The success of a VARA claim often
turns on the second element—“recognized stature.”59 This element
is considered to be a very high bar, and in an attempt to meet it,
artists can present “testimony of artists, dealers, curators,
collectors, and others who are involved in the creation and
appreciation of art.”60 As discussed above, and as the cases below
show, while an artist can attempt to enforce moral rights, VARA’s
application is very limited.61

Bougdanos, supra note 1, at 552.
McCartney, supra note 48, at 38.
51 Id.
52 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b) (2012); see also Bougdanos, supra note 1, at 551.
53 Bougdanos, supra note 1, at 551.
54 Id. at 552.
55 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Arts, July 24,
1971, 102 Stat. 2853, 828 U.N.T.S. 222.
56 Bougdanos, supra note 1, at 553.
57 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b).
58 Id.; see also Bougdanos, supra note 1, at 553.
59 17 U.S.C. § 106A. See generally Bougdanos, supra note 1, at 550.
60 17 U.S.C. § 106A; see also Bougdanos, supra note 1, at 554.
61 Bougdanos, supra note 1, at 553.
49

50
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In 1998, in Hanrahan v. Ramirez, a California judge found
that a wall mural painted on the exterior of a liquor store did in
fact meet the statutory requirements.62 The mural at issue in
Hanrahan “depicted an anti-drug, alcohol and smoking message
as a part of a community improvement plan.”63 Three years after
the mural was created, the owners of the store painted over half
of the mural and put an advertisement in its place.64 In response,
the plaintiff in Hanrahan brought a lawsuit under the destruction
clauses of VARA.65 The court found that because the mural had
been selected as a winner in a national contest and had
widespread local support, it had recognized stature.66
It is important to note, however, that judicial recognition
of recognized stature will not occur in the large majority of graffiti
art cases, as the stature element requires a factual determination
and is applied on a case-by-case basis. For this reason, many
works of graffiti art, excluding murals like the one discussed
above, fall outside the scope of VARA. Courts have reflected this
in holding that VARA does not apply to works of art that cannot
be removed and are illegally placed on another person’s property
without their consent.67 Additionally, VARA only protects against
the destruction of art—VARA cannot help artists who are
attempting to prevent unauthorized copying and reproduction.68
VARA rights are preservationist in nature because they
apply only to original artwork.69 Even when a litigant is pursuing
preservation under VARA, however, the claims will likely fail. In
English v. BFC & R East 11th Street LLC, the district court ruled
that illegally created wall murals were not protected under
VARA.70 The court in BFC held that VARA “does not apply to
artwork that is illegally placed on the property of others, without
their consent, when such artwork cannot be removed from the site
in question.”71

62 See Hanrahan v. Ramirez, No. 2:97-CV-7470 RAP RC, 1998 WL 3439997,
at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 1998).
63 Bougdanos, supra note 1, at 564.
64 See Hanrahan, 1998 WL 3439997, at *2.
65 Id.
66 Id.; see Bougdanos, supra note 1, at 564.
67 Smith, supra note 3, at 268 (citing English v. BFC & R East 11th St. LLC,
No. 97 Civ. 7446(HB), 1997 WL 746444, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1997)).
68 See supra Section I.B.
69 Celia Lerman, Protecting Artistic Vandalism: Graffiti and Copyright Law,
2 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 295, 330 (2013).
70 English, 1997 WL 746444, at *5.
71 Id.
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The very nature of graffiti makes removal without
complete destruction impossible.72 Additionally, VARA provides
that its protections are limited to those listed in section 113(d),73
which “protects a real property owner’s rights to improve,
renovate, or raze their property by declining copyright protection
for any ‘work of visual art [that] has been incorporated in or made
part of a building’” even when it would cause “destruction,
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work.”74 Thus,
although VARA offers protection to graffiti artists in limited
circumstances, it will not provide the kind of protection that
artists like Revok, Reyes, and Steel are seeking. The next type of
claim that graffiti artists could try to use to enforce their rights is
one arising under copyright law.
B.

Copyright

In addition to protections under VARA, graffiti artists can
also seek protection for their work under copyright law. But this
route to protection provides its own obstacles for graffiti artists.
To be protected under copyright law, a work of art must be
an “(1) original (2) work of authorship (3) fixed in a tangible
medium of expression from which it can be perceived.”75 In order
to state a copyright infringement claim, a plaintiff “must allege
ownership of the copyright, registration, and infringement.”76 And
“[u]nder U.S. copyright law, if a street artist creates an
unsanctioned work on another party’s building or wall, the real
property owner owns the ‘material object’ or ‘tangible medium,’
and therefore owns the actual physical copy of the artwork.”77
These elements were applied in a case in the Northern
District of Illinois, Villa v. Pearson Education, where a graffiti
artist brought an action for copyright infringement after his
artwork was reproduced without his permission.78 The court listed
three factors that would impact the extension of copyright
protection to graffiti art: (1) registration, (2) legality of the
72 Al Roundtree, Graffiti Artists “Get Up” in Intellectual Property’s Negative
Space, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 959, 970 (2013).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 John Eric Seay, You Look Complicated Today: Representing an Illegal
Graffiti Artist in a Copyright Infringement Case Against a Major International Retailer,
20 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 75, 79-80 (2012).
76 Villa v. Pearson Educ., Inc., No. 03 C 3717, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24686, at *2
(Dec. 9, 2003) (citing Sweet v. City of Chicago, 953 F. Supp. 225, 227 (N.D. Ill. 1996)).
77 Smith, supra note 3, at 267.
78 Pearson Educ., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24686, at *1.
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creation, and (3) level of “creativity exhibited in [the] original
[artwork].”79 The defendants argued that Villa could not obtain
copyright protection because the mural was illegally created and
incorporated words and letters.80 The court declined to rule on
those two issues, deeming them factual questions, which are
improper on a 12(b)(6) motion.81 The court did indicate that
looking into these assertions “first would require a determination
of the legality of the circumstances under which the mural was
created . . . [and] second would necessitate an evaluation of the
degree of creativity exhibited in [the artist’s] original mural.”82
While a claim like the one in Villa facially fulfills the
factors that courts consider for a copyright claim, courts have left
the door open to “potentially excluding ‘illegal’ street art from
traditional intellectual property protection.”83 Villa does this by
placing two potential hurdles in front of graffiti artists seeking
protection under copyright law: legality and creativity.84 After
Villa, one commentator stated that courts will “be reluctant to
grant copyright protection to a piece of unsanctioned street art, or
may allow ‘illegality’ to be raised as a[n] . . . ‘unclean hands’
defense” to copyright infringement.85
One commentator has argued that “[f]ailing to provide
copyright protection to these artists inhibits the advancement and
progression of the arts, which directly conflicts with the basic
purpose of the Copyright Act.”86 Regardless, after Villa, it will be
hard for a potential litigant to overcome the unclean hands
defense, which could work to preclude copyright protection for
graffiti artists. “[T]here is [also] a strong normative intuition that
a work made in violation of the law should not be entitled to
copyright protection.”87 That is, there is a moral feeling that there
should not be a capital gain from breaking the law.88 This is
generally referred to as the unclean hands doctrine.89 Courts like
that in Villa have recognized the unclean hands doctrine as a
defense in copyright infringement cases.90 “The doctrine of
Id. at *7.
Id. at *2.
81 Id.
82 Id. at *3.
83 Smith, supra note 3, at 264.
84 Pearson Educ., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24686, at *7.
85 Smith, supra note 3, at 265-66.
86 Schwender, supra note 32, at 258.
87 Davies, supra note 6, at 29.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 29-30.
90 See Villa v. Pearson Educ., Inc., No. 03 C 3717, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24686,
at *1 (Dec. 9, 2003); see also Schwender, supra note 32, at 258.
79

80
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unclean hands, originally an equitable defense, essentially states
that a plaintiff should not profit from his wrongdoing.”91 This
could be one major stumbling block to a graffiti artist seeking
protection under U.S. copyright law.
Even if courts allow copyright protection of graffiti art
after Villa, defendants like Cavalli will likely be able to get
around this protection because copyright law will not prevent the
removal and sale of works of art.92 If Cavalli simply paid the
owner of the wall for the art, he would own it and could freely
reproduce it. Thus while copyright law offers graffiti artists a
potential avenue for protection, it is untested, and as discussed
above,93 is treated somewhat harshly by the courts.94 Additionally,
at least one of the claims by graffiti artists alleging violations of
copyright law has settled out of court, and if that continues, there
will be little precedent to guide courts and litigants.95
C.

The Lanham Act
1. Unfair Competition

A claim of unfair competition under the Lanham Act is a
claim of trade dress infringement. Trade dress is defined as “[t]he
design and shape of the materials in which a product is
packaged.”96 A trade dress can be the product design, configuration,
or shape. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act will protect the trade
dress if it “serves the same source-identifying function as a
trademark.”97 The Lanham Act will also protect a trade dress that
has not been federally registered,98 but it is important to note that
there is no “product” in a graffiti case.
A design must be distinctive in order to be protected under
the Lanham Act.99 Although section 43(a) of the Lanham Act does
not require a distinctive trade dress in order for a work of art to
receive the Act’s protections, courts have collectively enforced that
requirement.100 As the court stated in Wal-Mart v. Samara Bros.,
without the element of distinctiveness, it is unlikely that the use
Schwender, supra note 32, at 258.
Smith, supra note 3, at 266-67.
93 See supra Section II.B.
94 Davies, supra note 6, at 38.
95 Id. at 28.
96 Trade Dress Definition, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/trade_dress [http://perma.cc/8ZXV-AL74] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
97 Id.
98 Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).
99 See generally Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros, 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
100 Id. at 210.
91
92
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of a trade dress would cause confusion, so it follows logically that
the “distinctive” element is required.101 In Wal-Mart v. Samara
Bros., Wal-Mart was selling “a line of spring/summer one-piece
seersucker outfits decorated with appliques of hearts, flowers,
fruits, and the like,” which mirrored Samara’s product line.102 At
the time, a representative from JC Penny, which was under
contract with Samara to sell the clothing line, saw the products at
Wal-Mart and thought they were Samara products. JC Penny
complained to Samara that Wal-Mart was selling the Samara
product at a lower price than that which JC Penny was
contractually permitted to sell the clothes.103 JC Penny, upon
discovering that the clothes being sold at Wal-mart were not
actually Samara’s, filed a lawsuit claiming that Wal-Mart had
infringed on their trade dress and that it amounted to unfair
competition under the Lanham Act.104 The trial court found that
this clothing line had a distinctive trade dress that could be
protected by section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.105 But the Supreme
Court reversed the decision, holding that “in an action for
infringement of unregistered trade dress under § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, a product’s design is distinctive, and therefore
protectable, only upon a showing of secondary meaning,” and the
court held that Samara had not made the requisite showing that
the clothing had secondary meaning.106
According to the Court, a mark can be distinctive in two
107
ways. First, a mark can be inherently distinctive, meaning that
its “intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source.”108
Second, a mark can acquire distinctiveness when “it has
developed secondary meaning, which occurs when, ‘in the minds
of the public, the primary significance of a [mark] is to identify
the source of the product rather than the product itself.’”109
Graffiti artists can claim that the trade dress is their
signature or style because it identifies a particular source. The
rationale is that the artist has worked for years to develop a
certain reputation, which allows the public to easily identify the
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

768 (1992)).

Id.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 208.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 210-11.
Id. at 210 (quoting Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,

109 Id. at 211 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851
& n.11 (1982)).
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work as the artist’s, and therefore the use of the artist’s signature
or style amounts to an infringement of the artist’s trade dress.110
The artist’s signature would have secondary meaning where,
upon seeing a famous graffiti artist’s signature, one could identify
the creator of a particular work of art.111 Therefore, infringement
of a trade dress would be a potentially viable claim for a graffiti
artist seeking protection from unauthorized commercial use of
their art. The only limiting factors in this claim would be the
artist’s popularity and how well known the signature is. “[T]he
minds of the public”112 language suggests that a large number of
people must be misled in identifying the source of the product.
2. False Designation of Origin
The Lanham Act protects all aspects of registered
trademarks.113 “In addition to protecting registered marks, the
Lanham Act, in § 43(a), gives a producer a cause of action for the
use by any person of ‘any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof . . . which . . . is likely to cause
confusion . . . as to the origin . . . .’”114 This protection does not
allow one to use “false designations of origin, false descriptions,
and false representations in the advertising and sale of goods and
services.”115 But the Act “does not prohibit false statements
generally. It prohibits only false or misleading descriptions or
false or misleading representations of fact made about one’s own
or another’s goods or services.”116 A false designation of origin is a
statutory, federal tort apart from common law unfair competition
and is not limited to lawsuits between business competitors.117
Additionally, it does not require ownership of a registered
trademark.118 Specifically, Congress enacted section 43(a) to
codify the common law-defined act of “‘passing off,’ which is the
representation of one person’s goods or works as those of

Complaint, supra note 18, at 10-12.
See Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 211.
112 Id.
113 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).
114 Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 211 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)).
115 Herb Reed Enters., Inc. v. Monroe Powell’s Platters, LLC, 25 F. Supp. 3d
1316, 1321 (D. Nev. 2014) (quoting Jack Russell Terrier Network of N. Ca. v. Am.
Kennel Club, Inc., 407 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005)).
116 Groden v. Random House, Inc., 61 F.3d 1045, 1052 (2d Cir. 1995). See
generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).
117 Origin, representations concerning, ALR Digest Antitrust and Trade
Regulation [West] (2015) (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)).
118 Id.
110
111
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another.”119 Judge Clark of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in a concurring opinion discussing the scope of
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, said that it is a “quite extensive
provision covering the false description or representation of goods
introduced into commerce . . . [and] there is indication . . . that the
bar has not yet realized the potential impact of this statutory
provision.”120
When looking to this provision of the Lanham Act, it is
important to consider the common law background and the
legislative history of the Act.121 The need for the protections
afforded by section 43(a) of the Lanham Act was realized well
before it was enacted.122 Efforts to carve out a statutory protection
for misuse of designations of origin can be traced to 1918, when it
was deemed necessary to implement domestic legislation
reflecting the United States’ ratification of the Buenos Aires
Convention of 1910.123 Article VIII of the Buenos Aires Convention
provides that “the false representation as to the origin of a
product, shall be prosecuted by the interested party in accordance
with the laws of the State wherein the offence is committed.”124
When this idea was codified in 1920, it “provided a federal
statutory basis for private protection against one particular type of
unfair competition not resulting from the infringement of a
registered trademark.”125 The Lanham Act has now superseded
section 3 of the Act of March 19, 1920 (1920 Act),126 but it is
interesting to note that this section of the 1920 Act was of “such
limited application as to deprive it of almost all practical use.”127
The Lanham Act was intended to cover more false designation of
origin claims and be less restrictive.128
Had section 3 of the 1920 Act been applicable to a graffiti
case like the one brought against Cavalli and other infringements
similar to those discussed in Part I,129 the claim would likely have
119 Denine C. Pagano, “Origin of Goods”: Delving Into Dastar Corp. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 421, 422 (2005).
120 Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 546 (2d
Cir. 1956) (Clark, C.J., concurring).
121 Walter J. Derenberg, Federal Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First
Decade of the Lanham Act: Prologue or Epilogue?, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1029, 1032 (1957).
122 Id. at 1033.
123 Id. (footnote omitted).
124 Id.
125 Id. at 1034.
126 Act of March 19, 1920, Pub. L. No. 163-104, 41 Stat. 533.
127 Walter J. Derenberg, Federal Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First
Decade of the Lanham Act: Prologue or Epilogue?, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1029, 1034-35 (1957).
128 Id. at 1035.
129 See supra Part I.
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been successful. Section 3 of the 1920 Act “referred only to false
designation of origin, thereby excluding from its scope any other
forms of misdescription or misrepresentation”; further, “[t]he
section was limited to articles of merchandise . . . [and] required a
showing that the use of the false designation of origin occurred
‘willfully and with intent to deceive.’”130 The case against Cavalli
satisfies these elements. Cavalli did not create the art, so a false
designation occurred, and the act was likely willful because he
took pictures of the art and printed it knowing he did not design
it. Thus, it does not follow that the Lanham Act is less restrictive,
because the use of graffiti as alleged in Cavalli would not be
covered by it.
For a valid claim under section 43 of the Lanham Act for
false designation of origin, a litigant must prove three elements:
“(1) The alleged violator must employ a false designation; (2) the
false designation must deceive as to origin, ownership or
sponsorship; and (3) the plaintiff must believe that ‘he or she is or
is likely to be damaged by such [an] act.’” 131
Courts consider the following factors when making the
determination of likelihood of confusion: “(1) strength of the mark;
(2) proximity or relatedness of the goods; (3) similarity of the
marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels;
(6) type of goods and degree of purchaser care; (7) intent in
selecting mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion.”132 In this inquiry,
no one factor is dispositive, and not all of the factors will apply in
every case.133 The question of confusion is one of fact, and thus
“[t]he state of mind of the public must be the basis for the court’s
determinations but the plaintiff is not required to prove the
likelihood of confusion at the pleading stage.”134
One court has found that under section 1125(a) of the
Lanham Act, there was a valid claim of infringement when a work
was edited without the consent of the writers and thus departed
substantially from the original work.135 In Gilliam v. American
Broadcasting, the art being transformed was a Monty Python
comedy skit that before being aired was edited to such an extent
Derenberg, supra note 127, at 1034-35; see Act of March 19, 1920, 41 Stat. 533.
Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 551 (E.D. Va. 1998) (citing 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012)).
132 Herb Reed Enters. v. Monroe Powell’s Platters, LLC, 25 F. Supp. 3d 1316,
1324-25 (D. Nev. 2014); Walter v. Mattel, Inc., 210 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000);
AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979).
133 Herb Reed Enters., 25 F. Supp. at 1325.
134 F.E.L. Publ’n, Ltd. v. Nat’l Conference of Catholic Bishops, 466 F. Supp.
1034, 1044 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
135 Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1976).
130

131
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that it changed the nature of the work. The court in Gilliam
stated that “[t]o deform . . . [an artist’s] work is to present him to
the public as the creator of a work not his own, and thus makes
him subject to criticism for work he has not done . . . . [Thus] it is
the writer or performer, rather than the network, who suffers the
consequences of the mutilation . . . .”136 The court further stated
that “an allegation that a defendant has presented to the public a
‘garbled,’ distorted version of plaintiff’s work seeks to redress the
very rights sought to be protected by the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a), and should be recognized as stating a cause of action
under that statute.”137 After Gilliam, changing the nature of the
work has become a high water mark for other courts in deciding
whether or not the Lanham Act will provide protection.
The district court in Choe v. Fordham made it clear that
for protection under the “changing the nature of the work”
standard, the level of deformation has to be radical and to such a
point that the essential meaning of the artwork is lost.138 This
“high water mark” is potentially insurmountable for graffiti artists
because it can be argued that their work is not radically changed
when, for example, someone takes a picture of the art and then
sells the image. But if the action of photographing and reselling an
image is recast as changing the meaning of the original work,
graffiti artists might overcome this high bar. Printing a work of
graffiti art on various goods takes the art out of context and may
constitute a radical deformation of the work.
After getting over the bar of the standard, a plaintiff must
show that the defendant substantially distorted the original
work.139 Finally, the mark must almost automatically identify the
source.140 One potential problem graffiti artists might face in
seeking protection under the Lanham Act is that it “is designed to
make actionable the misleading use of marks in interstate
commerce and to protect those engaged in interstate commerce
against unfair competition,” and technically these artists are not
engaged in interstate commerce with their works.141
In a case in the Eastern District of Virginia, America
Online, Inc. v. IMS, a marketing company accidentally sent 60
million unauthorized email advertisements containing “aol.com”
Id. at 24.
Id. at 24-25 (citation omitted).
138 Choe v. Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, 920 F. Supp. 44, 47-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
139 Lish v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1106-07 (S.D.N.Y.
1992); Follet v. New Am. Library Inc., 497 F. Supp. 304, 311-12 (S.D.N.Y 1980).
140 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000).
141 Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 551 (E.D. Va 1998).
136
137
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in the subject line.142 The plaintiffs alleged a claim of trademark
infringement under the Lanham Act.143 The court held that AOL
had pled a claim on which relief could be granted because people
were likely to be confused about whether the email came from
AOL itself.144 The court reasoned, “[a]ny email recipient could
logically conclude that a message containing the initials ‘aol.com’
in the header would originate from AOL’s registered intent
domain.”145 The same is true of the false designation of a graffiti
artist’s work. Any follower of a famous graffiti artist, upon seeing
his signature on goods and services, could logically conclude that
the graffiti artist was working for the company.
One potential hurdle to using the Lanham Act as a source
of protection for graffiti art is that Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth
Century Fox potentially closes the door on the Lanham Act being
a source of viable protection for graffiti artists. While it has not
yet been argued, it is conceivable that if many graffiti artists
begin seeking protection, it will be. However, Dastar is
distinguishable from the issues presented by the unauthorized
commercial use of graffiti. Recently, in the case against Cavalli,
the argument that Dastar precludes the Lanham Act from
protecting graffiti artists was used and denied.146 The court held
that Dastar only dealt with reverse passing off, and that is not
what the Artists in the case against Cavalli were alleging. Rather,
the allegations were “that Defendants’ use of [plaintiff Chapa’s]
‘revolutions’ imagery created the ‘false and deceptive impression
that the Just Cavalli garments and accessories are associated
with and/or manufactured by [Chapa] and Plaintiffs.’”147
Therefore, the plaintiffs were claiming that Cavalli sold products
with their source-identifying images. The court stated, “[t]his
conduct constitutes passing off, which occurs when a producer
sells its own goods while misrepresenting that they were made by
another.”148 The court then concluded that since this constituted
passing off, and not reverse passing off, Dastar did not preclude
Chapa’s Lanham Act claim.
In Dastar, the author of a book about World War II
granted exclusive television rights to Twentieth Century Fox Film

142
143
144
145
146
147
148

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, supra note 31.
Id.
Id.
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Corporation (Fox).149 The writer renewed the book’s copyright in
1975, but Fox did not renew the television series, which left the
series in the public domain.150 In 1988, Fox then reacquired the
television rights.151 Dastar Corporation released a video in 1995
entitled “World War II Campaigns in Europe,” which it made
from tapes of the original version of the television series.152 The
tapes were acquired from the public domain.153 Fox filed suit,
alleging that Dastar’s sale of the video without proper credit to
Fox was reverse passing off under the Lanham Act.154 The
Supreme Court held that there was no false designation of origin,
stating that “[b]ecause . . . Dastar was the ‘origin’ of the [physical]
products it sold as its own, respondents cannot prevail on their
Lanham Act claim.”155 The court went on to define “origin” as “the
producer of the tangible product sold in the marketplace.”156 The
Court went further to say “the phrase ‘origin of goods’
is . . . incapable of connoting the person or entity that originated
the ideas . . . that ‘goods’ embody or contain.”157 According to the
court, consumers do not generally care about the origin, and the
Court stated that “the Lanham Act should not be stretched to cover
matters that are typically of no consequence to purchasers.”158
Based on the Court’s holding that there was no Lanham
Act violation because Dastar created the “physical product,” one
could imagine Cavalli arguing that he did not violate the Lanham
Act because he too created the physical product being sold in the
market. But the facts of Dastar are distinguishable from graffiti
art cases, and the policy reasons for the Court’s decision,
particularly avoiding superfluity in protecting what copyright law
already protects,159 do not similarly inform graffiti art cases.
Additionally, the holding that origin “refers to the producer of the
tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author of
any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods,”160
does not include graffiti artists. In the case of graffiti, the artist is
not simply the author of an idea, but rather, the artist actually
produces a tangible item. The Dastar court reasoned that offering
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160

Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 25 (2003).
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 32-33.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 37.
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Lanham Act protection to “communicative products” (such as the
videos made by Dastar) “that are valued for the intellectual
content that they convey . . . would cause trademark law to
conflict with copyright law.”161 The court distinguished
communicative products “from products that are valued for their
physical qualities, like a hammer or a can of cola.”162 When graffiti
art is viewed through this lens, it is clear that it is closer to the
hammer and the can of cola because it is valued for its physical
qualities. Therefore, using the Lanham Act to protect graffiti is
not in conflict with copyright law in the way that protecting Fox’s
videos would have been.
Even if graffiti was considered to be a communicative
product, Dastar still does not preclude protection under the
Lanham Act. “The Supreme Court reasoned it should follow
that misinformation about the origin of a ‘communicative
product’ can only be protected by the Lanham Act if that
misinformation deals with the producer of the physical product
itself.”163 The use of art, particularly the art of a well-known
graffiti artist, is not like identifying cola with Coke or Pepsi. By
using the graffiti artists’ independent signatures, the confusion
relates to the identity of the producer of the physical product
itself. Therefore, if it is a communicative product, it is one that
should be protected after Dastar.
III.

THE LANHAM ACT IS THE BEST OPTION FOR PROTECTING
GRAFFITI ART

Although graffiti artists appear to have a few options to
protect their work, most of these options are not viable. In the
current legal landscape, and as discussed below, the Lanham Act
is the best route to protection. When deciding to bring a case,
artists will have to decide which claims to plead. This will depend
on what type of redress the artist is seeking. For example, if the
artist wants to prevent the art’s destruction, VARA is the best
choice, as those rights are preservationist in nature.164 But if an
artist wants to enjoin a designer from using the artist’s work
without permission, VARA will not suffice.

161 Timothy C. Connor, After Dastar: Can a Right of Attribution Still Exist
Under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 9 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 11, 27-28 (2004).
162 Id.
163 Id. at 15 (citing Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33).
164 See supra Section II.A.
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There are three significant obstacles for a graffiti artist
seeking VARA’s protections.165 First, VARA rights are
preservationist in nature and do not relate to reproduction.
Second, VARA has a requirement that the work of art be of
recognized stature, which sets a very high bar.166 Finally, the
unclean hands doctrine provides infringers with an affirmative
defense.167 For these reasons, VARA is not a viable option for
graffiti artists seeking protection from unauthorized commercial
uses of their art.
Copyright law is similarly unable to protect graffiti art.
Graffiti artists face four main obstacles to securing copyright
protection. First, the application of copyright law to graffiti is
largely untested, and in the few cases that have been before a
judge, the courts have treated the claim with hostility.168 A
greater problem is that graffiti artists’ claims of infringement
brought under copyright law tend to settle, which means there is
little precedent to indicate whether a litigated copyright claim
could be successful.169 It is not clear why these cases settle, but
one potential explanation is that because the outcome is unclear,
there is more risk in allowing the courts to decide this question.
Additionally, if a judge decides these cases, there will be a record
that will have precedential value, whereas if there is a settlement,
it can be secretive, where no one knows the specific details.
Moreover, courts like the one in Villa strongly indicate that this
type of claim will fail.
Villa put in place three main hurdles for artists like
Revok, Reyes, and Steel in using copyright law to protect their
work from uses like Cavalli’s. First, the work must be registered;
second, the work must be original; and third, illegality of creation
can potentially be used as an affirmative defense.170 The court in
Villa said that it would look into the originality and the “degree of
creativity exhibited in [the artist’s] original mural.”171 The court
alluded to the fact that the use of “words and letters” might weigh
against a finding of creativity in the mural and therefore prevent
the satisfaction of the “creativity” element.172 The last and most
significant problem Villa presents for copyright protection for
See supra Section II.A; 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012).
See supra Section II.A; 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
167 See supra Section II.A; 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
168 See supra Section II.B; Villa v. Pearson Educ., Inc., No. 03 C 3717, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 24686 (Dec. 9, 2003).
169 See supra Section II.B; Pearson Educ., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24686.
170 See supra Section II.B; Pearson Educ., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24686.
171 See supra Section II.B; Pearson Educ., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24686.
172 See supra Section II.B; Pearson Educ., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24686.
165

166
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unauthorized commercial uses of graffiti is that it opens the door
for the illegality of creation, or unclean hands, to be used as an
affirmative defense, which results in courts’ refusal to protect
graffiti artists from this type of infringement.173 Hence, copyright
protection will likely not reach or protect graffiti art that is used
in commercial products without the consent of the artist.
The last source of law available to graffiti artists, and the
one with the most potential coverage for their infringement
claims, is section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. This route to
protection provides the best odds of success and presents artists
with two different types of claims—unfair competition and false
designation of origin.174
First, an unfair competition claim under section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act will be successful if it can be proved that the
mark is inherently distinctive and has a secondary meaning.175
Graffiti from a well-known artist can likely satisfy these
elements. Murals, especially the one at issue in the case against
Cavalli, are inherently distinctive. Additionally, each artist
generally has a unique style that can be considered a trade dress.
That trade dress develops secondary meaning and identifies the
artist who painted it. An artist who is not well known enough
may be unsuccessful in pursuing an unfair competition claim
under the Lanham Act. Fortunately for Revok, Reyes, and Steel,
they are well-known artists whose style and signatures would be
easily identifiable by their followers.176
Second, a false designation of origin claim under the
Lanham Act is another viable option for potential protection and
remedy for plaintiffs like Revok, Reyes, and Steel. They could
likely prove the three elements needed to plead a claim for false
designation, including that (1) a false designation was employed;
(2) there is a likelihood of confusion; and (3) harm is caused. As to
the first element, Roberto Cavalli and other potential defendants
are employing false designations of origin by using the art. The
second element is met because the art being used includes the
Artists’ signatures. In America Online, the use caused a likelihood
of confusion because it included the company’s signature. This is
especially true when the signature is the artist’s name, where
people familiar with the artist’s work would associate the
signature with the work and therefore mistakenly believe the
173
174
175
176

See supra Section II.B; Pearson Educ., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24686.
See supra Section II.C; 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210-11 (2000).
See supra Part I; Complaint, supra note 18, at 2.
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artist had sold the designs to the infringer. Many graffiti artists
have an online presence, as well, and their work is thus easily
identifiable by their style, even if it is unsigned.177 Third, it can be
argued that the depiction and unauthorized use of their art
causes harm to the reputations of graffiti artists, because as
discussed above, some followers of these artists would assume
they have “sold out.”178
The Lanham Act elements could be satisfied for a graffiti
claim, and the holding of Dastar does not get in the way. One way
to frame the argument for protection of graffiti, notwithstanding
the holding of Dastar, is that art is a “good” under the meaning
the court subscribes to in Dastar, and graffiti is a form of art.
Lanham Act protection should extend to graffiti because a
“defendant’s failure to credit . . . is actionable only where the
defendant literally repackages the plaintiff’s goods and sells them
as the defendant’s own.”179 Taking a picture of the artwork and
reprinting it on a different product is the same as repackaging the
good and reselling it as your own.
While Dastar has been extended to cases other than those
involving the use of videos in the public domain, Dastar should
not be extended to graffiti or art in general. It doesn’t seem to
apply to the Cavalli case because Cavalli put a physical product
in the marketplace, and he should not be allowed to infringe on
the rights of the creator of the art that was reprinted on that
physical product. Additionally, there are strong policy reasons for
protecting graffiti and encouraging the creation of art, such as the
advancement and protection of the arts.180
Furthermore, in using the false designation of origin
analysis, the unclean hands doctrine181 can be flipped on
defendants like Roberto Cavalli to prevent them from profiting
from their wrongdoing. Instead of allowing these defendants to
use this affirmative defense as a shield to liability, the defense
can instead be a sword for plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
It is worth noting that graffiti artists whose art was
illegally created might have difficulty seeking protection because
of the normative values of the unclean hands doctrine. It is also
177
178
179
180
181

Lerman, supra note 69, at 329.
See supra Section I.B.
Pagano, supra note 119, at 462.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
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important to keep in mind that many claims of infringement
brought by graffiti artists will likely settle, so it will be hard to
consistently gauge what will or will not be a valid claim. But
judging from past case law and society’s changing thoughts on the
value of graffiti art, the Lanham Act will potentially be a valid way
to protect these works of art from unfair and unauthorized use.
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